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This article looks to the recent ‘removed flag’ controversies in Northern Ireland to 
argue that post-conflict decision-making should be underpinned by principles of 
international human rights law and by a checklist of fiduciary obligations for 
decision-makers to actively peace-keep. Useful guidance on cultural property rights 
is drawn upon from amongst indigenous case law on cultural easements; political 
decision-makers are framed as the trustees of a peace process that morally obliges 
them to maintain a meaningful level of community involvement and consensus and 
that is underpinned by post-conflict norms of tolerance and mutual respect. The 
article argues that long-held ‘other-side’ fears and perceptions should be afforded a 
meaningful level of respect, as should symbolic items of cultural heritage that 
‘belong’ to newly minoritised sections of the community. 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the factors inhibiting the development of a political, civic and communal 
commitment to dealing with the past, is a deep suspicion that opponents only want to 
excavate a truth which they can manufacture into ammunition with which to continue the 
conflict.1 
 
In late 2012, a series of road blocks by outraged loyalist2 protesters occurred throughout Northern 
Ireland in response to Belfast City Council’s decision to stop the daily flying of the Union Flag !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*  LLB (QUB), CPLS (Solicitor) (IPLS, QUB), LLM (Distinction) (QUB), PGCHEP (Ulster), FHEA, PhD 
(Ulster), Lecturer, School of Law, University of Ulster. The author would like to thank her colleagues in the 
Transitional Justice Institute (TJI) and the School of Law, University of Ulster, not least Professors Rory 
McConnell and Fionnualla ni Aolain (Directors of TJI) for their insightful comments and helpful advice in 
respect of earlier drafts of this article. Thanks are also due to Alice Biscu for her editing skills, key 
suggestions and kind patience. Any errors or omissions herein are entirely the fault of the author.  
1  Commission for Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland), Dealing with the Past: Advice to Government 
(June 2010) 38 [178] <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/docs/cvs/cvs_280610.pdf>.  
2  The term ‘loyalist’ refers here to those aspects of political, national and cultural identity that find expression 
in loyalty to British institutions (eg Monarchy and Military Service) and seek continued political union with 
the rest of the United Kingdom/Great Britain. Such ‘Britishness’ has traditionally been claimed by many 
members of the Protestant Unionist-Loyalist (‘PUL’) community within Northern Ireland, as demonstrated 
by the long-held electoral mandate of ‘Unionist’ political parties (eg the Democratic Unionist Party, the 
Ulster Unionist Party, the Progressive Unionist Party).  
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(the ‘Union Jack’) at City Hall and other government buildings throughout the province.3 
Generally the protesters’ banners read ‘They took our flag!’, although some protesters also 
articulated wider fears over the perceived erosion of Protestant cultural heritage and identity. 
Their signs warned against the perceived ‘ethnic cleansing of British citizens’ and they 
questioned, in televised and public debates, why their human rights to parity of esteem, equality 
of treatment and cultural integrity, etc were being denied. The decision to remove the Union Flag 
was defended by nationalist4 politicians and based upon the changing demographics5 that saw 
nationalist politicians become the largest block on Belfast City Council (albeit without an 
absolute majority).6 The decision was also validated on the ground that the new policy conformed 
with the customs and policies of (the rest of) the United Kingdom, where the Union Flag flies 
from Government buildings on ‘designated days’ only (eg royal birthdays).7 In defence of the 
highly controversial decision, nationalist councillors also referred to Belfast City Council’s own 
report on the use of ‘contentious’ symbols (ie flags, displays, artefacts and memorabilia) in 
promoting or hindering ‘a good and harmonious environment’8 and to the Northern Ireland 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  See Claire McNeilly, ‘Belfast Flag Protests: We Won’t Stop Until the Flag is Back’, Belfast Telegraph 
(Online), 3 January 2013 <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/belfast-
flag-protests-we-wont-stop-until-the-flag-is-back-16256705.html>. 
4  The term ‘nationalist’ refers here to those aspects of political, national and cultural identity (‘Irishness’), 
which seek alignment with the Republic of Ireland, rather than with Great Britain, and, perhaps, also seeks an 
eventual end to the partition of Ireland and a ‘United Ireland’. This has traditionally been claimed by many 
members of the Catholic-Nationalist community, as demonstrated by the electoral mandate of the Nationalist 
parties (ie Sinn Fein, the Social Democratic Labour Party).  
5  The 2011 Northern Ireland Census indicated that approximately 48 per cent of the population identified 
themselves as British, with the remainder identifying either as Irish (28 per cent) or as Northern Irish (29 per 
cent): Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, ‘Census 2011: Key Statistics for Northern Ireland’, 
Statistics Bulletin (11 December 2012) <http://www.nisra.gov.uk/Census/key_stats_bulletin_2011.pdf>.  
6  Belfast City Council currently has 51 members: 24 Nationalist councillors (16 Sinn Fein, 8 Social 
Democratic Labour Party) to 21 Unionist councillors (16 Democratic Unionist Party, 3 Ulster Unionist Party, 
2 Progressive Unionist Party) and 6 politically undesignated, ‘non-sectarian’ (formerly Unionist) Alliance 
Party councillors (who essentially hold the balance of power in such decisions). The new 60 member Council 
(elected on 22 May 2014 as part of local government reforms) will sit from 1 April 2015. It comprises 26 
Nationalist councillors (19 Sinn Fein, 7 Social Democratic Labour Party), 24 Unionist councillors (13 
Democratic Unionist Party, 7 Ulster Unionist Party, 3 Progressive Unionist Party, 1 Traditional Unionist 
Voice) and 10 undesignated members (8 Alliance Party, 1 Green Party and 1 ‘People Before Profit 
Alliance’). As before, these ‘non-sectarian’ parties are likely to be key to future decisions on the sharing of  
cultural space. See ‘Election Results 2014’ Belfast City Council 
<http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/council/Elections/results-2014.aspx>. 
7  See United Kingdom, Guidance: Designated Days for Union Flag Flying (27 February 2013) 1 
<https://www.gov.uk/designated-days-for-union-flag-flying>. This policy refers to Government buildings. In 
Northern Ireland there is also a rule for Government buildings but this does not cover councils: see The Flags 
(Northern Ireland) Order 2000 (UK) and The Flags Regulations (Northern Ireland (2000) (UK). The Flags 
and Emblems (Display) Act 1954 (Northern Ireland) was repealed by the Public Order (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1987. 
8  See Belfast City Council, Policy on the Flying of the Union Flag: Equality Impact Assessment — Final 
Decision Report (November 2012) 11  
<http://minutes.belfastcity.gov.uk/documents/s66734/Flags%20EQIA%20Final%20Decision%20Report%20
Appendices.pdf> (‘EQIA Final Decision Report’) on how the control of flags, displays, artefacts and 
memorabilia falls within the wider remit of promoting a ‘good and harmonious environment’.  
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Equality Commission’s publication on workplace harmony and neutrality.9 In sum, they argued 
that the Union flag’s presence had made for an uncomfortable reminder of the troubled history 
and politics of Northern Ireland and that the employees and visitors at City Hall would be better 
served by having a neutral, flag free environment, especially given the increase in the 
nationalist/Catholic population of Belfast.   
 
This article suggests that the recent unrest in Northern Ireland might have been avoided had the 
Northern Irish decision-makers looked to the provisions of international law on cultural heritage 
rights for guidance. The article proposes a ‘peace-keeper’ checklist that summarises the 
application of such an approach, which could in turn serve as a useful template for decision-
makers in other post-conflict contexts by highlighting the need for a deeper understanding of the 
role of international law principles in those settings.  
 
 
II FLAGS AS SACRED SYMBOLS OF MINORITY CULTURAL HERITAGE 
  
Given that ‘symbols play an essential role in human culture’,10 the removal of one side’s 
emblems may be perceived as holding profound political, ethnic or religious significance. Brown 
has argued that ‘memory work’ involving ‘the use and meaning of memorials that can mark 
politically sensitive space’ might ‘communicate very densely the messages and tone of political 
actors’. 11  This is often highly relevant to the ‘lived political life of many groups and 
communities’ and also for gauging the success or otherwise of protractedly ‘fractious transitions’ 
in post-conflict contexts.12 
 
Flags, in particular, can provoke deep emotions associated with political or cultural surrenders, 
lost or emergent nationhood, ancestral homelands, shared histories, and a communal sense of 
identity. By the same token, they can serve as uncomfortable reminders of religious and political 
conflict or signify national mourning, the claiming of ‘unexplored’ lands or the ceding of 
disputed territories. The ‘honourable seizure’ of an enemy’s flag is itself symbolic as it marks the 
end of war or violent conflict, or even surrender.13 Flag desecration might, depending upon 
jurisdiction, be deemed to be either a criminal offence or legitimate political dissent (ie freedom !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  See Northern Ireland Equality Commission (Northern Ireland), Promoting a Good and Harmonious Working 
Environment (2009) 
<http://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Publications/Employers%20and%20Service%20Providers/Pr
omoting_a_good_and_harmonious_working_environment.pdf>. See also Office of the First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister (Northern Ireland), Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration (2010) 
<www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/reformatted_final_print_version_csi_-_26.07.10.pdf>. 
10  Kabir Duggal and Shreyas Sridhar, ‘Reconciling Freedom of Expression and Flag Desecration: A 
Comparative Study’ (2006) 2(1) Hanse Law Review 141, 145. The sight of a flag can enable or provoke 
profound memories and emotions, especially where such an emblematic item has long been associated with 
nationhood, ancestry, shared histories, and a communal sense of identity. See, further, Robert Jewett and 
Constance Collora, ‘On Turning the Flag into a Sacred Object’ (1995) 37(4) Journal of Church and State 
741, 741–743 for the maintenance of pax deorum via ritual observances and how secular symbols might be 
used, via a ‘language of the sacred’, to create a ‘religion of the flag’ with freedom of expression (eg flag 
destruction) perhaps serving to represent any ‘protest against perceived evils’.  
11  Kris Brown, ‘“High Resolution” Indicators in Peace-Building: The Utility of Political Memory’ (2013) 7(4) 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 492, 494. 
12  Ibid 493. 
13  See Duggal and Sridhar, above n 10, 145. 
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of expression).14 Flag removal might constitute cultural disrespect or it could be aimed at 
provoking outrage or heralding a new age of freedom and inclusiveness. Its presence could also 
be a reminder of past atrocities and may ‘punish’ those who resent what it represents or once 
stood for.15  
 
However, assuming that the act of flag flying is categorised as a cultural custom that is essential 
to maintaining ancestral heritage, then it may fall within the protective remit of cultural property 
rights. If so then flag removal takes on a deeper significance in terms of sending political 
messages to ‘the other side’. Although minority communities are not necessarily always 
indigenous or newly-immigrant ones they may face similar issues in a post-conflict transitional 
period, including population shrinkage, some level of population drift towards segregated or 
psychologically ‘enclaved’ living areas, and a need to preserve those customs and practices 
underpinning their community’s identity and heritage. In relation to retaining some degree of 
control over disputed public ‘spaces’ (eg territories, emblems and finite resources like police 
time) and eliciting or maintaining some measure of public sympathy, a normative emphasis upon 
exclusivity of possession still tends to dominate political and legal discourse.16 Much of the 
jurisprudence on minority cultural heritage seems to suggest that collective group claims 
involving identity-relevant artefacts could be framed as rights-bearing ‘cultural easements’.17 In 
other words, where items and practices are grounded in communal histories or near-sacred 
traditions, they are more likely to be regarded as essential to the realisation of cultural heritage 
and identity rights. As Mezey has further observed,  
 
as groups become strategically and emotionally committed to their ‘cultural identities,’ 
cultural property tends to increase intra-group conformity and intergroup intransigence in the 
face of cultural conflict.18  
 
In terms of engaging with democratic processes, majority populations have often demonstrated a 
poor record of effecting meaningful recognition of minority cultural rights.19 Aggrieved minority 
groups might feel that eventual outcomes involving the loss or rationing of cultural symbols or 
customary activities will be based largely upon the ‘surrender’ of their unique socio-cultural 
identity.20 Overwriting, in the sense of assimilating or eroding one side’s cultural identity, may 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  Ibid 147. 
15  James E Wood, ‘Making a Nation’s Flag a Sacred Symbol’ (1989) 31 Journal of Church and State 375, 376.  
16  See, further, Hurst Hannum, ‘The Limits of Sovereignty and Majority Rule: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, 
and the Right to Autonomy’ in Ellen L Lutz, Hurst Hannum and Kathryn J Burke (eds) New Directions In 
Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989) 20. 
17  Naomi Mezey, ‘The Paradoxes of Cultural Property’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 2004, 2007.  
18  Ibid. 
19  Hannum, above n 16, 5 (albeit in terms of settler populations). See, further, Duggal and Sridhar, above n 10, 
141 on how groups lacking the ‘ear’ of their own governments may have little option but to turn to 
‘demonstrative means’ to give voice to their opinions. 
20  Ibid. 
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turn them into powerless ‘onlookers’21 and force them to adopt ‘a view of themselves and of the 
world that fits with the rights-conferring political machinery of the state’.22 On this view, grateful 
‘beneficiaries’ of the ‘minority tolerant’ majority population must accept unfamiliar ‘political 
institutions and thinking’,23 often as acquiescent observers, perhaps with little input into future 
decisions on their cultural heritage.  
 
However, the notion that a sort of ‘sacred trust’ can arise between those who govern and the 
aggrieved minority community has been acknowledged via international case law on minority, 
indigenous cultural rights. The right to be meaningfully ‘consulted with’ over contentious 
decisions exists,24 although it appears to be tied to the issue of whether irreparable harm or undue 
hardship might have been suffered by the affected community.25 In R v Seward, the length of 
time that the contentious custom or tradition had been carried out was particularly relevant.26 
Where an artefact possesses some iconic or talismanic role ‘in the preservation of cultural 
heritage’27 this aspect of it might be irreversibly compromised by its misuse, for example where it 
has been seized or insensitively put on public display against the wishes of the minority.28 
Although this practice may be condemned by the courts, it is possible that this can only occur 
after some form of tangible harm has been suffered by the vulnerable group, as occurred in 
Mohawk Bands v Glenbow-Alberta Institution. However, cultural property losses may be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21  This is likely to be especially so in terms of cultural property rights, where legal arguments may have only 
been made ex post facto. See Colin Samson, ‘Rights as the Reward for Simulated Cultural Sameness: The 
Innu in the Canadian Colonial Context’ in J K Cowan et al (eds), Culture and Rights: Anthropological 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 226, 226–248 
<http://ebooks.cambridge.org/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO9780511804687&cid=CBO9780511804687A020>. See, 
further, Alice Diver, ‘“A Just War”: Protecting Indigenous Cultural Property’ (2004) 6(4) Indigenous Law 
Bulletin 43, for a discussion on the links between cultural property and religious rights. 
22  Samson, above n 21, 228.   
23  Ibid 241. Equally, accepting ‘contrivance of sameness’ may mean relinquishing a significant degree of 
autonomy in return for receiving some form of ‘compensation’ for the loss of heritage: at 242. Although the 
difficulties faced by the ‘new minority’ in Northern Ireland clearly differ from those traditionally suffered by 
indigenous communities in general (that is, a history of colonisation, actual or near extermination, continuing 
denial of a wide range of basic human rights) there are common issues in terms of perceived cultural heritage 
erosion, post-conflict mutuality of tolerance and the need to resolve disputes over shared spaces and items. 
24  See, eg, Convention (No 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, opened 
for signature 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383 art 6 (entered into force 5 September 1991); United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 107th plen mtg, Supp 
No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007) art 32.   
25  See Kamal Puri, ‘Cultural Ownership and Intellectual Property Rights Post-Mabo: Putting Ideas into Action’ 
(1995) 9 Intellectual Property Journal 293.  
26  R v Seward [1998] 3 CNLR 237. 
27  On the Darwinist focus of some of the older pieces of legislation see Juan Andres Fuentes, ‘Protecting the 
Rights of Indigenous Cultures under the Current Intellectual Property System: Is It A Good Idea?’ (2003) 3 
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 88, 101 
<http://www.jmripl.com/Publications/Vol3/Issue1/fuentes.pdf>.  
28  See, eg, Mohawk Bands v Glenbow-Alberta Institution (1988) 3 CNLR 70 Alta QB where a sacred tribal 
mask used in spiritual ceremonies was placed on permanent public exhibition against the wishes of the tribe 
and an injunction for its removal was refused on the basis that no ‘irreparable harm’ had apparently been 
suffered by the group.  
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irreversible.29 Subsequent judicial acknowledgement is unlikely to be of comfort to the affected 
group, who may have no way of reinstating the cultural practice or mending the damage done. 
Similarly, legal protection in other contexts may depend upon the contentious activity being 
grounded in communal need (eg group survival).30  
 
Judicial or political reluctance to accept the harm arising from the loss of control over cultural 
property may reinforce the ‘distance between the discourses of people from two societies’.31 For 
the minority group, the relinquishing of decisions on cultural heritage to an elected or 
government appointed body might be seen as defeatist acceptance of a loss of autonomy; symbol-
rationing may further marginalise aggrieved groups who may feel gradually, and perhaps 
irreversibly, ‘exiled’ from formerly occupied cultural spaces.32 As such, a ‘conquering’ majority 
can easily send out a very strong signal that its culture is somehow ‘materially and spiritually 
superior’ to the other.33  
 
As a result, decision-makers in post-conflict contexts should be extremely careful to demonstrate 
a high level of respect for the cultural rights of new minorities, especially as their actions might 
be perceived by the minority group as a sign of the ‘extinguishment’34 of their heritage or 
identity. Meaningful equality-rights analyses and clear acknowledgement of the potential 
consequences of decisions that affect the minority are key to the peace process. As such, clear 
reasons for the proposed rationing or removal of the cultural easement should be set out in full. 
This is especially so where the government has agreed to accept a positive obligation to fully 
‘acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for public purposes’ and to 
ensure that they are ‘used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division’.35 The 
following section sets out a number of relevant provisions of international law that highlight the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29  See Kitkatla Band v British Columbia (Minister of Small Business Tourism and Culture) (2002) SCC 31 [46] 
(Donald J) (on the loss of culturally modified trees). The decision followed Delgamuukw v British Columbia 
[1997] 3 SCR 1010, where the Supreme Court eventually ordered the preservation of items, despite the fact 
that many of them had by then already been cut down and thus destroyed. 
30  John Borrows, ‘Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster’ (1998) 22(1) 
American Indian Law Review 37 <http://www.web.uvic.ca/~bthom1/Media/pdfs/abrights/rights.htm>.  
31  Brian Thom, ‘Rising to the Test: Meeting Lamer’s Tests for Aboriginal Rights and Title After Delgamuukw’ 
(Paper presented to Canadian Anthropology Society, Quebec City, 1999) 
<http://www.web.uvic.ca/~bthom1/Media/pdfs/abrights/tests.htm>.    
32  See, further, Alexis Heraclides, The Etiology of Succession in the Self-Determination of Minorities in 
International Politics (Cass, 1991) 14 on how secession claims need territory, population and a ‘suitable 
relationship’ with central authority.  
33  Steven C Perkin, ‘Researching Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under International Law’ (Revised Paper 
Presented to Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Libraries, 1992) <http://intelligent-
internet.info/law/ipr2.html>. 
34  See Erica-Irene A Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People (United Nations, 1997) 4. 
35  See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Republic of Ireland), The Agreement: Agreement Reached in 
the Multi-Party Negotiations (1998) (‘Belfast Agreement’) s 24, s 6.5 (‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of 
Opportunity — Economic, Social and Cultural Issues’) <http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Anglo-
Irish/agreement.pdf5>, which states that: 
 
All participants acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for public purposes, and 
the need in particular in creating the new institutions to ensure that such symbols and emblems are used in 
a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division. Arrangements will be made to monitor this 
issue and consider what action might be required.  
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importance of affording meaningful respect to key aspects of ‘other side’ cultural heritage and 
underpin the ‘peace-keeper checklist’ that is suggested in the concluding section.  
 
 
III RESPECT FOR CULTURAL PROPERTY AND HERITAGE RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
A wide range of ‘intangible’ items and activities are included within the protective definitional 
remits of cultural heritage property rights. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (‘Protection in Armed Conflict’) provided an initial 
focus on the misappropriation of cultural property and war-time vandalism.36 It widely defines 
cultural property as ‘movable or immovable property’ and calls for its protection via systems of 
‘safeguarding’ based upon ‘respect’.37 Article 1(a) highlights the importance and variety of 
cultural property ‘irrespective of origin or ownership’:  
 
[Cultural property is] of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as 
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; 
groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; 
manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well 
as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of 
the property defined above.38 
 
The Convention’s principles are generally applicable and thus not necessarily ‘limited to 
controlling the conduct of belligerents in time of war or civil conflict’.39 It makes no distinction 
between those cultural objects that may be of mere regional or local interest and those that might 
be classed as having ‘truly international importance’40 because all forms of cultural property have 
an intrinsic value and thus belong ‘to all mankind’.41 Article 4(4) may hold particular resonance 
for anyone who has lived through the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ insofar as it requires parties to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36  Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, opened for signature 14 
May 1954, 249 UNTS 240 (entered into force 7 August 1956) (‘Convention for Protection in Armed 
Conflict’). 
37  Ibid art 1, 2. Article 2 states that ‘[f]or the purposes of the present Convention, the protection of cultural 
property shall comprise the safeguarding of and respect for such property [emphasis added]’. 
38  Ibid. Article 1 looks also to:  
 
(b)  buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural 
property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of 
archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural 
property defined in subparagraph (a); 
(c)  centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to 
be known as ‘centres containing monuments’. 
  
39  John Henry Merryman, ‘Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property’ (1986) 80(4) American Journal of 
International Law 831, 842. 
40  Ibid 837. Merryman notes, also, that objects which might seem essentially parochial in nature, or of 
importance to only one section of the community, may subsequently assume historical significance or gain 
socio-cultural importance amongst a wider audience.  
41  Convention for Protection in Armed Conflict Preamble para 2.  
86            MACQUARIE LAW JOURNAL   [Vol 13 
 
!!
refrain ‘from any act directed by way of reprisals’ against the cultural property of another.42 
Although the removal or rationing of a flag is unlikely to be deemed illegal misappropriation, 
destruction or desecration, it could be argued that curtailment of the customary act of flag flying 
during a period of post-conflict transition is nonetheless a significant gesture made towards one 
side of the community that has been recently minoritised. 
 
Such a gesture, having been made by nationalist politicians seemingly on behalf of the majority 
social group, could be regarded as targeted redress by the new majority for past social injustices 
that were carried out or quietly sanctioned by the former majority. The outcome at least sends out 
a fairly unequivocal message that future control over significant spaces and emotive emblems has 
shifted to one side of the community. In addition to this, the difficult question of ‘who actually 
won?’ may hang in the air close to where key symbols have been removed from (or added to) 
public spaces. In this sense, a flag’s absence may also signal a profoundly changed political 
landscape. 
 
The issue of who can (or should) have the final say over matters of visible cultural heritage is no 
less significant in international law. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation’s (‘UNESCO’) Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (‘Preventing Illicit Transfer’)43 
differs in emphasis from the Protection in Armed Conflict. As Merryman observes, it aims to 
provide guidance in terms of resolving disputes, calling for the ‘retention of cultural property by 
source nations’.44 The Preamble stresses that protections for cultural heritage are a ‘basic element 
of civilisation’.45 It also notes that a heritage item’s ‘true value can be appreciated only in relation 
to the fullest possible information regarding its origin, history and traditional setting’.46 Finally, 
each nation clearly has ‘moral obligations to respect its own cultural heritage and that of all 
nations’.47 The focus is not so much on preventing destruction and loss but on achieving the 
active repatriation of items, thus underscoring the importance of ownership and highlighting that 
context matters. Therefore, the way in which the item is meant to be kept or preserved merits 
significant consideration. 
 
The UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
(‘Safeguarding Intangible Heritage’) has further widened the protective remit beyond that of 
cultural property and symbolic objects to include those ‘practices, rituals and traditions that are 
defined as integral to the identity and continuity of the groups to which they belong’.48 A decision 
by a majority group to end an important minority custom or to restrict the display of an ‘other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42  Ibid art 4(3). The provision also requires parties to ‘further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, 
put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, 
cultural property’. 
43  Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property, opened for signature 14 November 1970, 823 UNTS 232 (entered into force 24 April 
1972).  
44  Merryman, above n 39, 846. See for example art 2(1) on the ‘impoverishment of cultural heritage’ and art 10 
(b) on the need to ‘create and develop in the public mind a realization of the value of cultural property’. 
45  Preventing Illicit Transfer Preamble para 4. 
46  Ibid.  
47  Ibid Preamble para 6. 
48  Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, opened for signature 17 October 2003, 
2368 UNTS 35 (entered into force 20 April 2006). See also Mezey, above n 17, 2012. 
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side’ symbol or artefact may well fall within these parameters. Although no explicit reference is 
made to flags, the link between the need for visibly upheld traditions and mutual, forward-
looking tolerance are highlighted. Article 2(1) states that the ‘practices, representations … objects 
… [and] cultural spaces’ that ‘communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognise as 
part of their cultural heritage’ merit protection given that these may be ‘transmitted from 
generation to generation … constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their 
environment … and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity’.49  
 
The Preamble also highlights the importance of social context, noting that:  
 
The processes of globalization and social transformation, alongside the conditions they 
create for renewed dialogue among communities, also give rise, as does the phenomenon of 
intolerance, to grave threats of deterioration, disappearance and destruction of the intangible 
cultural heritage.50  
 
The Convention seems grounded upon the presumption that ‘when culture engenders the deepest 
feelings of belonging then culture itself must in turn belong’;51 communities, rather than 
governments are now generally regarded as the ‘primary holders’ or controllers of their own 
culture.52 It follows that cultural heritage items and practices might be easily appropriated by 
‘others’ who are keen to indicate which side of a divided community currently holds more power 
in terms of territorial control.    
 
A ‘cautious approach’ to such disputes could ‘recognise costs and consequences as well as 
contingency and complexity of the groups to which law assigns the property right’.53 However, 
the potentially narrow concepts of ‘property rights’ and ‘ownership’ do not always give rise to 
flexible solutions involving shared heritage: they may, in turn, define and limit other norms of 
heritage promotion.54 Where social attitudes are engendered or influenced by narrow legal rules 
at a domestic level — especially where one group sees themselves as having fought against social 
injustices such as housing or employment inequalities, for example to claim ownership over 
particular items or traditions as ‘theirs’ — this could further influence public perceptions and 
limit political policies.55  
 
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions (‘Promotion of Diversity’) confirms that ‘cultural diversity is a defining 
characteristic of humanity’ that forms ‘a common heritage’ that ‘should be cherished and 
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49  Safeguarding Cultural Heritage art 2(1). 
50  Ibid.  
51  Mezey, above n 17, 2012. Mezey also argues that cultural heritage also often serves as a ‘foundation for a 
sense of human belonging’ and that notions of property and human dignity are so closely linked as to 
sometimes ‘bleed into each other’: at 2008.  
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid 2007. 
54  Ibid 2005. Mezey further argues that cultural property law is ‘currently unequipped’ to resolve such disputes, 
especially those involving ‘hybrid’ symbols (such as indigenous mascots), which have been appropriated and 
largely controlled by the majority population.  
55  Ibid 2026. 
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preserved’;56 when ‘flourishing within a framework of democracy, tolerance, social justice and 
mutual respect between peoples and cultures, [cultural diversity] is indispensable for peace and 
security’.57 Similarly, the Preamble to the UNESCO Recommendation on the Historic Urban 
Landscape (‘Historic Urban Landscape’) notes that: 
 
Historic urban areas are among the most abundant and diverse manifestations of our 
common cultural heritage, shaped by generations and constituting a key testimony to 
humankind’s endeavours and aspirations through space and time.58   
 
The consideration of a wider context, which informs the definition of cultural heritage rights, 
includes the 
 
built environment, both historic and contemporary, its infrastructures above and below 
ground, its open spaces and gardens, its land use patterns and spatial organization, 
perceptions and visual relationships, as well as all other elements of the urban structure.59  
 
The consideration of a wider context also highlights the importance of ‘social and cultural 
practices and values, economic processes and the intangible dimensions of heritage as they might 
relate to cultural diversity and identity’.60  
 
Also included within the ‘Glossary of Definitions’ is the concept of ‘cultural significance’, which 
is defined as those items and customs that hold some 
 
aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations. 
Cultural significance is embodied in the place itself, its fabric, setting, use, associations, 
meanings, records, related places and related objects. Places may have a range of values for 
different individuals or groups.61 
 
In terms of utilising shared contested spaces, the refusal to allow places or objects to be used as a 
means of cultural expression is far from conciliatory. In relation to the protection of identity via 
traditional customs, the UNESCO Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture 
and Folklore (‘Safeguarding Traditional Culture’) highlights the variety and importance of  
 
tradition-based creations of a cultural community, expressed by a group or individuals and 
recognized as reflecting the expectations of a community in so far as they reflect its cultural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56  Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, opened for signature 
20 October 2005, 2440 UNTS 346 (entered into force 18 March 2007) Preamble para 3. 
57  Ibid. 
58  United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation, Recommendation on the Historic Urban 
Landscape, UNESCO General Conference, 36th sess, UNESDOC C/RES 41 (10 November 2011).  
59  Ibid.  
60  Ibid annex I. 
61  Historic Urban Landscape app. The definition was taken from the International Council on Monuments and 
Sites, The Burra Charter: The Australian ICOMOS Charter for Places of Cultural Significance (1999) art 1.2 
<http://australia.icomos.org/wp-content/uploads/BURRA_CHARTER.pdf>.  
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and social identity … Its forms are, among others, language, literature, music, dance, games, 
mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts, architecture and other arts.62 
 
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (‘Declaration on Cultural Diversity’) 
provides further direction on how culture should be regarded, by confirming in its Preamble that  
 
culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group, and ... it encompasses … lifestyles, ways of 
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.63 
 
Tolerance and social consensus are essential elements of post-conflict decision-making, as is a 
visibly reciprocal ‘respect for the diversity of cultures, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation, in a 
climate of mutual trust and understanding’.64 Article 2 highlights cultural pluralism as the natural 
successor to (mere) tolerance of cultural diversity ‘to ensure harmonious interaction among 
people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities’;65 norms of ‘inclusion and 
participation’ should thus direct ‘policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity’ according 
to the Declaration.66 Article 4 states that ‘the defence of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, 
inseparable from respect for human dignity’.67 The need to defend cultural diversity is even more 
paramount when ‘the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ are involved.68 Similarly, ‘no one 
may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor 
to limit their scope’.69 Article 5 confirms that ‘cultural rights are an integral part of human rights, 
which are universal, indivisible and interdependent’.70 It also states that cultural pluralism is 
‘indissociable from a democratic framework … conducive to cultural exchange and to the 
flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life’.71 Decision-makers who belong to a 
political party associated with the majority group in society and find themselves in control of the 
cultural symbols of their political opponents would do well to draw upon these provisions. 
 
The UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance (‘Declaration on Tolerance’) provides 
perhaps the clearest guidance on how sensitivity might be demonstrated during an adolescent and 
shaky peace process to prevent relapses into violent conflict. Its Preamble states that ‘all positive 
measures necessary’ should be taken to ‘promote tolerance in our societies, because tolerance is 
not only a cherished principle, but also a necessity for peace and for the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples’.72   
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62  United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation, Recommendation on the Safeguarding of 
Traditional Culture and Folklore, UNESCO General Conference, 25th sess, UNESDOC C/RES 7.6 (15 
November 1989).  
63  UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO General Conference, 31st sess, UNESDOC 
C/RES 25 (2 November 2001) Preamble para 6. 
64  Ibid Preamble para 8. 
65  Ibid art 2. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid art 4. 
68  ‘and those of indigenous peoples’: Ibid art 4.  
69  Ibid. 
70  Ibid art 5. 
71  Ibid art 5. 
72  Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, UN GAOR, 51st sess, UN doc A/51/201 (16 November 1995).  
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Article 2(1) challenges law-makers to actively enact ‘just and impartial legislation, law 
enforcement and judicial and administrative process’ given that ‘exclusion and marginalisation 
can lead to frustration, hostility and fanaticism’.73  
 
Article 1(1) is particularly apposite, defining tolerance for cultural difference as being comprised 
of 
 
respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms 
of expression and ways of being human. … [Tolerance] is harmony in difference. It is not 
only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that 
makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of 
peace.74 
 
Furthermore, the International Labour Organisation’s Convention (No 169) concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (‘Indigenous Peoples in Independent 
Countries’) stresses the need for meaningful consultations and community participation.75 Article 
6(1) requires governments to  
 
(a)  Consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular 
through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to 
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly; 
(b)  Establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same 
extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective 
institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and 
programmes which concern them.76 
 
Article 6(2) similarly requires that: 
 
The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good 
faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving 
agreement or consent to the proposed measures.77 
 
The provisions on cultural heritage rights increasingly emphasise mutuality of respect,78 cultural 
pluralism,79 and forward-looking tolerance.80 The importance of protecting cultural diversity is 
also repeatedly stressed,81 as is the moral obligation upon those who hold power82 to avoid 
removing or destroying items of cultural heritage as some form of post-conflict reprisal.83 The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73  Ibid art 2(1).  
74  Ibid art 1(1). 
75  Convention (No 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, opened for 
signature 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383 (entered into force 5 September 1991). 
76  Ibid art 6(1). 
77  Ibid Art 6(2). 
78  Protection in Armed Conflict art 2. 
79  Declaration on Cultural Diversity arts 2, 4. 
80  Indigenous Peoples in Independent Countries, art 6, Declaration on Tolerance, art 1 and Safeguarding 
Intangible Heritage art 2.  
81  Promotion of Diversity Preamble and Declaration on Cultural Diversity arts 2, 4. 
82  Preventing Illicit Transfer Preamble. 
83  Protection in Armed Conflict art 2. 
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key democratic principles of ‘time and goodwill’ may, on their own, fail to create the sense of 
‘cultural security’84 needed to maintain a delicate peace process. The enactment and embedding 
of meaningful policies on mutual tolerance and cultural pluralism requires that suitable ‘spaces’ 
be made available for a wide range of cultural activities — even if majority communities may not 
view the policies as important to protect cultural identity or the cultural practices as socially 
significant or historically or politically appropriate given the one-sided or contentious nature of 
some cultural items. A ‘flexible notion’ of cultural heritage, based upon the fundamental human 
rights principles of tolerance, dignity and parity of esteem, could encompass the needs of ‘the 
other side’ with respect to cultural practices that are long grounded in visible display and thus 
essential ‘cultural easements’.85 
 
However, even if cultures are willing to regard each other as equals, their desire to co-exist 
happily in an atmosphere of ‘mutual respect’86 might overlook the fact that many legal templates 
for shared ownership of cultural ‘space’ are steeped in violent political conflict that denotes a 
harsh struggle for power, justice or basic survival through ‘generational continuity’.87 Where a 
group’s cultural heritage has, to some extent, been socially or politically constructed through a 
struggle for power, their psychological need for emblematic displays and set rituals may develop 
an urgency that other groups cannot fully fathom, but their views should still form part of the 
complex process of finding workable resolutions.88 On the other hand, where objects have long 
carried a deeply symbolic meaning, decisions over their usage and display might be best left to 
the community to which the objects belong given that they will be most affected by their 
absence.89  
 
However, as Levinson has argued in respect of controversial flags in the United States, an 
unavoidable aspect of cultural pluralism may well be that ‘different cultures are likely to have 
disparate, and even conflicting, notions of who counts as heroes or villains’.90 Thus simply 
labelling everyone as either a ‘survivor’ or a victimiser’ is a dangerous approach,91 especially in 
times of post-conflict ‘peace’ and during uneasy transitional periods when issues of blame and 
victimhood (not to mention questions of ‘who actually won?’ or ‘did one side surrender?’) are 
still being discussed. Adopting an informal policy of ‘silent language’92 in order to frame 
decisions on cultural symbols as being simply about the promotion of a good and harmonious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84  See, further, Steven Wheatley, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Minorities’ (2003) 14(3) European Journal of 
International Law 507.  
85  Mezey, above n 17, 2016. 
86  Ibid.  
87  Ibid 2012. 
88  Ibid 2019. 
89  See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Conflict Resolution: Two Theories and 
Practices of Participation in the Polity’ [2006] 12 Dispute Resolution Magazine 18 for the need for 
meaningful community consensus. In an acutely divided society, one side’s sacred heritage item may be seen 
as a cruel reminder of past injustices or recent atrocities. See, further, James Forman Jr, ‘Driving Dixie 
Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols’ (1991) 101 Yale Law Journal 505, 510 
for how ‘discriminatory intent’ may increase a flag’s ability to act as a ‘rallying symbol’ or stand for ‘a 
history of resistance to change’.  
90  Sanford Levinson, ‘The Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State Holidays, and the 
Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society’ (1995) 70 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1079, 1081.  
91  Ibid 1097. 
92  Ibid. ‘Silent language’ is that which avoids explicit mention of past conflict or of ongoing political 
difficulties. 
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environment or enhancing the visitor experience,93 as occurred in Belfast, seems equally ill-
advised. This approach may easily translate into a need to completely ‘erase’94 all signs and 
symbols of former regimes on the basis that their emblems are exclusively associated with 
injustices, racism, sectarianism, or human rights violations. Where such associations are attached 
to artefacts, acknowledging their contentious nature by ‘museumising’ them — as educational 
reminders of progress made and of the need to preserve peace for future generations — has some 
merit.95 This approach allows for the rationing of the item’s visibility, but it also requires solid 
community consensus and acceptance by the aggrieved community that the sight of their symbol 
has a double-edged and divisive aspect to it that will not necessarily be acceptable to the other 
side.  
 
To have power over emotive items and aspects of one’s culture is to generally be in control of 
one’s future and territory, especially in periods of post-conflict or transition. Decision-makers 
should bear this in mind, given the messages that an absent or present emotive emblem can send 
out. As Horn-Miller has argued in relation to indigenous issues, ‘the principles that underlie 
meaningful participation in consensus-based decision-making’ almost invariably tend to require 
much ‘respect for individual thinking and ideas’.96 The ‘Community Decision Making Process’ 
that she describes allows for concerned individuals to highlight legislative gaps and to call for 
urgent reforms. Community input, via information gathering, dialogue and feedback, is essential 
so that ‘all points of view are considered’.97 Of equal importance is the need for the wider 
community to have ‘trust in and knowledge of the process’.98 A moral obligation is placed upon 
all parties to focus primarily upon the welfare of future generations;99 the process draws upon the 
concept of seeing oneself as a care-taker for descendants by protecting culture and heritage and 
preserving a state of peace. It essentially   
 
asks the community to change its way of thinking … to go from thinking only of individual 
needs to considering the needs of the collective and the impacts of those decisions seven 
generations into the future.100 
 
Placing an over-arching emphasis upon the future would, perhaps, be somewhat at odds with one 
of the main strategies suggested as a means of resolving Northern Ireland’s current difficulties, 
which is to deal firstly with the past. The Haass Recommendations, which were rejected by 
Unionist politicians in 2013, looked closely, via community consultation processes, at ‘parades, 
select commemorations, and related protests; flags and emblems; and contending with the 
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93  See EQIA Final Decision Report, above n 8, 93–96.   
94  Levinson, above n 90, 1087. 
95  Ibid 1086. 
96  Kahente Horn-Miller, ‘What Does Indigenous Participatory Democracy Look Like?’ (2013) 18(1) Review of 
Constitutional Studies 112, 112. 
97  Ibid 126. 
98  Ibid 130. 
99  Ibid.      
100  Ibid. 
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past’.101 Despite the authors, Haass and O’Sullivan, having stressed the need for ‘equality before 
the law, equality of opportunity, good relations, and reconciliation’,102 political consensus for 
accepting the recommendations was not reached.103 It is generally acknowledged that the flags 
issue remains one of the main obstacles to achieving political progress in Northern Ireland.104  
If the removal or enforced regulation of culturally important symbols is perceived as a type of 
‘expressive conduct’105 on the part of decision-makers then the responses of those affected cannot 
be dismissed as irrelevant or inevitable aspects of political transition. The duty to preserve peace 
and to implement meaningful rights to cultural integrity includes a positive obligation on 
decision-makers to safeguard aspects and items of heritage. Where contentious decisions have the 
potential to fracture an agreed peace or reverse the progress that has already been made, decision-
makers should be compelled to look beyond majoritarian solutions and ground their decisions in 
broad-based public consensus that is underpinned by clearly reasoned policies of peace 
promotion. Asking the simple question ‘will this decision aid, hinder or actively jeopardise the 
peace process?’ may also go some way towards ensuring that sensitive decisions involving ‘other 
side’ cultural heritage show adequate regard for the rights of newly minoritised groups. 
 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
Consistent with respect for human rights, the practice of tolerance does not mean toleration 
of social injustice or the abandonment or weakening of one’s convictions. It means that one 
is free to adhere to one’s own convictions and accepts that others adhere to theirs. It means 
accepting the fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their appearance, situation, speech, 
behaviour and values, have the right to live in peace and to be as they are. It also means that 
one’s views are not to be imposed on others.106 
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101  Haass and O’Sullivan, Proposed Agreement: An Agreement Among the parties of the Northern Ireland 
Executive on Parades, Select Commemorations, and Related Protests; Flags and Emblems; and Contending 
with the past (31 December 2013) <http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf> (‘Haass 
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Northern Ireland, or a realisation that ‘dealing with’ matters does necessarily bring about an end to 
controversy or hostilities, remains to be seen. 
104  Richard N Haass and Meghan L O’Sullivan, Panel of Parties, Statement by Richard N Haass and Meghan L 
O’Sullivan  (8 January 2014) <http://panelofpartiesnie.com/s/2014-0108-NI-Statement-cptz.pdf> (‘NSE 
Statement’) for the Statement in response to the failure to reach all-party agreement. 
105  Wood, above n 15, 377.   
106  Declaration on Tolerance art 1(4).  
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Protests over the ‘flag(s) issue’ in Northern Ireland have, at least, served to provide some 
indication of the health or otherwise of the peace process. Instances of civil disorder seem to 
represent some form of quasi-progress, insofar as unvoiced fears have been given publicity, and 
heated public debates have replaced the uneasy silence that can be characteristic of ended 
hostilities or prolonged periods of transition. Ensuring that only one side is ‘left with an army’ 
may be one way of reducing the chances of a return to war;107 removing as many reminders of 
military conflict as possible from the public gaze may also represent a legitimate attempt to help 
communities forget or recover from recent civil wars or periods of prolonged paramilitary 
violence. However, the loss of a highly resonant, one-sided symbol such as the Union Flag at a 
relatively early stage of an already shaky peace process can provoke the opposite effect. Where a 
‘flag’s force as a symbol stems from its history,’108 decisions about its usage are often an 
indicator of which side ‘won’ in terms of political power and the control of public spaces and 
cultural expression. If transitional or post-conflict societies have remained sharply divided along 
socio-cultural lines, then the mere presence (or unpredicted absence) of items such as flags may 
be heavily loaded with unacceptable symbolism regarding who surrendered the most in terms of 
power upon reaching a peace settlement.  
 
The law is often limited when it comes to grasping the finer ‘complexities of culture’;109 the 
‘preservationist rhetoric’ of many property law discourses seems to suggest an ‘endangered 
species’ approach towards the various dilemmas associated with protecting heritage generally.110 
In addition, a ‘politically correct language of participation and citizenship’111 may promote 
localised democracy as the best means of preventing a return to full-blown violent conflict, but it 
may well overlook the heightened sensitivities of communities alarmed by the prospect of losing 
their identity. ‘Culturally endangered’ groups may be especially prone to feelings of ‘insecurity’ 
and ‘low cultural status,’112 especially where an apparent shrinking of ‘their share’ of communal 
space seems to have occurred. In other words, if contentious activities were viewed as essential 
easements necessary to avoid the ‘land-locking’ or erosion of one side’s cultural heritage, this 
might allow for a more sympathetic understanding of their importance. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the current situation in Northern Ireland might yet be resolved by 
public referendum, re-partitioning, or via more, perhaps unelected, overseeing Commissions.113 
The introduction of a new or neutral flag or the addition of more socially acceptable artefacts, 
emblems and symbols into shared public spaces (which reflect the region’s cultural diversity and 
changing demographic) may also be suggested as compromise options. The increasingly urgent 
need to find a solution to this particular problem rests firmly with those elected under a statutory 
obligation to engage in meaningful and equitable monitoring of the ‘impact of ... final policy in 
order to find out its effect on the relevant groups and sub-groups within the equality 
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107  Michael W Doyle, ‘The John W Holmes Lecture: Building Peace’ (2007) 13 Global Governance 1, 1.  
108  Forman, above n 89, 513.   
109  Mezey, above n 17, 2010. 
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111  Samson, above n 21, 228. 
112  Kenneth Ritzén, Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Swedish Encounters with 
Islam (1990). 
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categories’.114 They must similarly revise any policies where a ‘greater adverse impact than 
predicted’ has occurred;115 regarding equality monitoring and impact assessments, the initial 
focus upon the feelings and concerns of staff members and visitors at Belfast City Hall needs to 
be widened to include the concerns of those living in other areas of Northern Ireland who were 
seriously affected by the resultant ‘civil unrest’ through road blocks, violent protests by Loyalist 
groups, Dissident Republican bomb scares and (recently foiled) terrorist attacks.116  
 
Greater adherence to the principles of indigenous case law and human rights provisions on 
cultural heritage could provide a ‘peace-keeper’ checklist for resuming meaningful dialogues. As 
trustees of a fragile peace, decision-makers could be required to:  
 
a) adopt a ‘caretaker-focused’ approach that highlights the potentially, profound 
consequences of a failed peace process for future generations;  
b) admit the need for the permanent, bilateral or mutual ‘ceding’ of certain shared 
spaces or customs for ‘the greater good’;117 
c) accept the existence of a moral obligation to view others’ cultural heritage as 
comprising items and practices worthy of protection, perhaps through a form of 
‘trust’  akin to that which applies to vulnerable indigenous items or to items 
that are most likely to be destroyed in reprisal attacks in post-conflict settings;  
d) emphasise the need for greater awareness of how newly minoritised groups 
may perceive ongoing harm or future hardship by the loss of a formerly visible 
emblem, eg by taking its removal as a sign that they might soon be assimilated 
into, or driven out by, the majority culture; 
e) avoid assigning blame to victims from sections of a divided community or 
denying their ‘victim’ status;  
f) agree that principles of ‘military necessity’ place a higher value upon human 
life than on the need to preserve cultural objects;118  
g) address the difficult moral question of whether any degree of pleasure might be 
taken in seeing the ‘displeasure of others’ when it comes to reducing the 
visibility of a contentious symbol;119  
h) note that ‘human rights and culture can co-exist and thrive’120 and that the right 
to peace has itself long been regarded as a near-sacred entitlement;121  
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i) accept that ‘people, land and culture are indissolubly linked’;122 and 
j) embed the requirement for visible and mutual respect and tolerance towards the 
cultural heritage of former ‘opponents’ in law and policy.  
 
As Funk has observed, a ‘robust and deeply rooted process’ of peace-maintenance ultimately 
requires that local actors are not marginalised.123 Failure to gain the support of the community 
risks a return to a state of temporary cease-fire based upon short term deals ‘amongst elites’.124 
There is clear scope within the current Northern Ireland peace process for ‘bringing more voices 
to the table’125 on the issue of cultural heritage; preventing a return to the ‘dehumanising’ effects 
of entrenched religious animosities126 must be a priority for anyone tasked with protecting the 
‘frail’ peace. To this effect, framing contentious symbols (and certain customs) as near-sacred 
items of cultural property may go some way towards resolving prolonged or heated disputes over 
the need to have them removed or displayed.  
 
The practice of having ‘the few testify about issues that affect the many’127 risks blurring the 
points of concern: those who voice their fears (or indeed engage in protest) may not necessarily 
be in a minority in terms of worrying that their cultural heritage is being eroded and those who 
remain quiet throughout such episodes of unrest may, nonetheless, feel very strongly that the 
peace process is being jeopardised by short-sighted political decision-making. In any event, 
simply dismissing such concerns as being irrelevant falls far short of the ideal of acceptable 
conflict-resolution and consensus-building for the long term. Peacebuilding is the precursor to 
socio-legal transition through reforms to law and policy, which send clear messages as to how 
justice will be achieved; where one side of the community sees ‘their’ flag (and, by extension, 
their identity, history and culture) being removed, they may read into this act the message that 
your side was to blame for this conflict, you are no longer in control and you will no longer be 
given this amount of ‘cultural space’ for the display of emblems which we find offensive.  
 
On the other hand, framing the need for visible mnemonics as an essential aspect of the right to 
enjoy one’s cultural heritage may allow for a greater and more meaningful degree of community 
consensus, understanding and mutual tolerance.128 Whether Northern Ireland’s decision-makers 
are ready to see themselves as politically neutral, future-focused trustees of a communal peace 
that is realised in a ‘shared cultural space’ remains unclear. Nonetheless, they must at least !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
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acknowledge that flags, as iconic and emotive emblems of cultural identity, can easily convey 
(through their presence or absence) a ‘sharp political message’ of control, conquest and power 
over disputed territories and histories.129 A gradual (but relentless) population shift looks set to 
further alter the balance of power with respect to decision-making that has relevance to culture. 
In this context, any additional diminishing or dismissal of one side’s cultural traditions by the 
other seems likely to be even more laden with perceived political meaning. 
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